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Abstract: Tunneling Mechanism has been proven as an option to link the communication between IPv6 
networks and IPv4 environments without incurring the high costs of upgrading equipment. However, this 
mechanism has reduced the network performance and downgrade the level of security if compared to the native 
IPv6 network. The Transition Mechanism has also become a covert channel for spreading threats without being 
acknowledged by the network security tools. Even though the issue has been raised in the set of IETF rules, 
still they do not provide any recommendation to overcome the problem. Based on this reason, this study 
explored the effectiveness of conventional network security tools to detect any anomalies occurring on a 
tunneling mechanism especially against packet flooding attack in IPv6 tunneling. In order to achieve this 
objective, a testbed that has been deployed with conventional firewall and IDS is used to simulate the IPv6 to 
IPv4 tunneling mechanism, several network attacks are then launched and the network traffic is then captured 
to be analyzed. The result shows that the firewall with the default settings had blocked all the tunneling 
packets, while the firewall and IDS with the default rule of set had performed well in IPv4 but not in the IPv6 
tunnel. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a significant decrease 
in the number of unused Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) 
addresses, with Internet users having started focusing on 
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) (Waddington and 
Chang, 2002; Hassan and Sailan, 2011 ). In order to meet 
the needs of the addresses and overcome the 
weaknesses, Ipv6 has become an alternative to replace 
IPv4 as the main Internet Protocol (IP) (Deering and 
Hinden, 1998; Lee and Chen, 2008). Thus, researchers 
have begun focusing on IPv6 studies and its security. 
Currently, the issue of threats to IPv6 security has 
become the main research topic (Xinyu et al., 2007). Even 
though IPv6 security studies are being conducted 
actively, IPv4 security studies are still crucial especially 
during the transition process. According to Zagar and 
Grgic (2006), network security should be enhanced due to 
the implementation of IPv6 transition mechanisms has 
been offering a new vulnerabilities for network threats. 
IPv6 is also known as IPng (Internet Protocol Next 
Generation) designed as a successor to IPv4 by IETF 
(Internet Engineering Task Force) (Deering and Hinden 
1998). The implementation is still at the preliminary level 
and needs time to be fully implemented as an official IP. 
Threats in the IPv6 network is dominated by the 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack that mainly 
based on four types, which are the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) flood, the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
flood, the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
flood and Smurfs (Xinyu et al., 2007). One of method to 
give an early notice that an attack is launched is by using 
the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) (Yoo et al., 2011; 
Bahaman et al., 2011 ). Most IDSes have the ability to 
successfully detect several kinds ofDDoS in the IPv4 and 
IPv6 environments (Zhang, 2009). Yet, some researcher 
believes a carefully crafted attack that manipulate the 
packet encapsulated into the IPv4 packet via protocol 
type 41 is difficult to be detected by some of IDSes 
default rules. As protocol type 41 is an important element 
in the transition mechanism, the threat brought by the 
protocol type 41 can put the network infrastructure and 
resources at risk (Taib and Budiarto, 2007). Due to this 
reason, this paper seeks to address the said problem by 
looking at each of the possible transition mechanisms and 
studies its specific weaknesses in anticipating the 
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potential threats. In order to achieve this goal, an 
experiment is conducted to test the reliability of network 
security tools against DDoS threat through this 
mechanism. ICMP and IC1v1Pv6 flood attacks with valid IP 
addresses are used as a kind of threat in the experiment as 
it can be easily detected by IDSes. 
Tunneling mechanism: The Tunneling Mechanism 
(Conta and Deering, 1998; Carpenter and Moore, 2001) is 
a kind of transition mechanism that encapsulates the IPv6 
packet in IPv4 packet. Protocol field type 41 in the IPv4 
header or also known as Protocol-41 (Colitti et al., 2004) 
is used by the IPv6 transition mechanism to operate in the 
IPv4 network. Apart from Protocol-41, packets can also be 
encapsulated within UDP for the same purpose. The 
Tunneling Mechanism allows an IPv6 to operate and 
essentially maintain the IPv4 network. There are several 
reasons why this mechanism is needed in the present 
network. One of them is to bring the data to the 
transmission across networks that are incompatible, or to 
provide a safe route through the network in which the 
safety level is unknown. 
Tunneling Mechanism allows the host and router in 
an IPv6 network to communicate with the host and router 
on the other IPv6 networks through the existing IPv4 
network. IPv6 packet deliveries using encapsulated 
Protocol-41 can be illustrated in Fig. 1. Firstly, Node_ A on 
Network_ A sends an IPv6 packet to a gateway on 
Router_ A. Then, after referring to the routing table, the 
IPv6 packet is forwarded to the tunnel interface. Next, the 
Router_A encapsulates the IPv6 packet with an IPv4 
header. Consequently, the encapsulated packet is 
forwarded through the tunnel on Network_ C and at the 
end of the tunnel; the receiver router de-encapsulates the 
packet by removing the IPv4 packet header. Finally, based 
on the routing table, Router_ B sends a packet to the 
Node B on Network B. 
All the Tunneling Mechanisms are considered 
proven as a set of tools to enable a smooth transition to 
the IPv6. Unfortunately, not all of them are amenable as 
users' options. According to Karpilovsky et al. (2009), 
Table 1: Brief description ofIETF tunneling mechanisms 
Tunneling mechanism Site operations 
Teredo (Huitema, 2006) and 6-4 (Carpenter and 
Moore, 2001) are the other options for Tunneling 
Mechanisms, both of the mechanism give more 
performance compared to other such as 6 over 4 
(Carpenter and Jung, 1999), 6 in 4 (Nordmark and 
Gilligan, 2005), ISATAP (Templin et al., 2008), 6rd 
(Despres, 2010), TSP (Blanchet and Parent, 2010) and 
DTSM (A!Jaafreh et al., 2008). The description of the 
Tunneling Mechanisms is summarized in Table 1. 
According to Karpilovsky et al. (2009) these 
transition mechanism technologies are mainly used to 
avoid restrictions on the Firewall and Network Address 
Translation (NAT). This situation is a threat and provides 
a space for attacker to exploit and launched an attack. 
Although (Savola and Patel, 2004) have explained the 
security measures for the Protocol-41 packet on RFC 3964, 
the effectiveness of the firewall and IDS in detecting 
attacks on this environment is doubtful. Thus, most of 
firewal products come with default rule which will drop all 
those packets. Consequently this action has caused all 
the transition mechanism is unable to be implemented 
successfully. 
1Pv6 
header 
r········f"ii>~6····] 
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Router B 
Fig. 1: Principle ofIPv6 tunneling process 
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6 in 4 
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Tunnel Setup Protocol (TSP) 
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The network security tools: Nowadays, several network 
tools either freeware or commercial has been developed 
for the purpose to keep the network operation secure. In 
this study, the research used Firewall and IDS as the main 
security tool. 
IDS is responsible to identify interference, which is 
defined as an illegal use, misuse or abuse of computer 
systems by users who are either entities with invalid 
credentials or external users (Vokorokos et al., 2006). In 
addition, IDS is also used to help in preparing to defense 
the internal and the external attacking (Shu-Qiang et al., 
2009). One of the objectives in achieving early detection 
of invasion is to collect information from various systems 
and networks and analyze the sources of group 
information, looking for symptoms that lead to safety 
problems (Razak et al., 2002). By analyzing the success of 
this information, it can help to detect the invasion activity 
in the network. Although IDS has the ability to detect 
invasive behavior, it also has some weaknesses. The 
following signature is an example of a rule set in IDS that 
generates an alert if an IC:MP packet have an empty 
payload, TCMP type 8 and arriving from the outside. 
Alert icmp $EXTERNAL_NET any-> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ICNP 
PING NMAP"; dsize: O; it:ype: 8;) 
Yohannes and Xu (2003) and Zagar et al. (2007) 
described firewall as a device or software intended to 
allow or refuse network transmissions. It is often used to 
protect networks from unauthorized access while allowing 
legal traffics to pass based upon a set of rules which can 
be modified according to current needs. In addition, a 
firewall provider usually offers free updated rule sets. 
Therefore, most consumers will take advantage of the 
default settings and do not change it manually. The 
firewall is typically placed between a LAN and the 
Internet and other insecure networks. 
Flooding attack: This is a DoS attack (Meenakshi and 
Srivatsa, 2007; Huang and Meng, 2011) that is designed 
to bring a network or service down by multiplying out 
large amounts of traffic towards the target. In a typical 
distributed version, this attack is created using DoS 
software as an instrument of attack. Meanwhile a 
Distributed Denial of Service attack or DDoS is a 
collection of DoS infected nodes that has been remotely 
controlled by an attacker to be used for launching a 
DoS attack towards a target (Sam et al., 2006; 
Bhaskaran et al., 2007). According to Lee et al. (2011 ). 
DDoS, attacks may involve breaking into hundreds or 
thousands of machines all over the Internet. This can be 
illustrated in Fig. 2. 
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Attacker Victim 
Fig. 2: Distributed Denial of Service Attack 
The ICMP flood attack is one of main types ofDDoS 
attack. It is also known as ping flood attacks and makes 
use of the packet echo response mechanism. The attack is 
produced when the attacker sends a high volume of echo 
request ping packet to the victim node repeatedly until the 
victim node does not have time to serve other services. 
Even though ICMP has been upgraded to ICMPv6, the 
problem still remains as some of their primary functions 
are still the same. Thus flooding attack based on echo 
request mechanism can still be manipulated by the 
attacker in order to put down services on a server. 
This study look at the effectiveness of conventional 
network security tools to detect any anomalies occurring 
on a tunneling mechanism. In order to achieve this 
objective, a testbed that has been deployed with 
conventional firewall and IDS is used to simulate the IPv6 
to IPv4 tunneling mechanism, several network attacks are 
then launched and the network traffic is then captured to 
be analyzed. 
PROBLEM AND SECURITY ISSUES 
The transition mechanism is developed for the 
purpose of implementing the new protocol together with 
the existing one on the real environment without 
prejudicing it. Today, the use of the transition mechanism 
has been widely used around the world. For example, 
Hurricane Electric (HE) acting as a Tunnel Broker 
(Waddington and Chang, 2002), offers an internet 
gateway using IPv6 tunneling. Although security about 
the transition mechanism measures has been stated at 
(Savola and Patel, 2004), most administrators have less 
knowledge in this field and expect the default 
configuration on network security tools such as Firewall 
or IDS to monitor and control it. Problems will arise when 
the tools cannot detect the unwanted activity on the 
transition mechanism. As illustrated in Fig. 3, this matter 
can be explained in the following scenarios. 
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First scenario: An IPv4 network uses a firewall to detect 
and act on any intrusion or unwanted activities. 
Subsequently, a native IPv6 network is developed and 
uses a tunneling method as a gateway. After the tunnel is 
enabled, Router_ A encapsulates the IPv6 packet to the 
IPv4 packet. This encapsulated packet is named as IPv4 
Protocol-41. Most administrators assume that the packet 
is foreign, thus blocking it using the firewall. Furthermore, 
there is a firewall that has default access list that blocks 
this protocol. Its purpose is to prevent the misused or 
unwanted packets from entering the network. As a result 
of the action, there is no activity on the network, even 
though the tunneling mechanism has been enabled. In 
that case, all IPv6 packets cannot be routed to the 
gateway at the tunnel broker. 
Second scenario: A firewall allows IPv4 Protocol-41 
packets to make the incoming and outgoing networks. 
The IPv6 network is fully operational. All types of IPv6 
packets will be encapsulated to be Protocol-41, including 
the unwanted one. This scenario will open space for any 
attack from the outsider. The attack can be made to the 
IPv6 or IPv4 network if there is a node on the network 
using a dual-IP (Nordmark and Gilligan, 2005) 
configuration. Attacks against the network through the 
IPv4 network using the tunneling mechanism will occur if 
this Protocol-41 is unrestricted without inspection. 
In the next section, an experiment is performed to 
evaluate the effectiveness of network security tools 
against threats through this transition mechanism. 
Fig. 3: Scenario where protocol-41 packets are allowed or 
denied by firewall 
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EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
The experimental procedure is divided into several 
parts as described briefly in Fig. 4. Furthermore, each pait 
is specified clearly in the following sections. 
Threat requirement: The main objective of this 
experiment is to review the effectiveness of the firewall 
and IDS against threats through the tunneling mechanism. 
According to Xinyu et al. (2007) almost all types of 
DoSIDDos attacks on the IPv6 environment can be 
controlled using IPSec especially when the attacker 
spoofs the IP addresses. Unfortunately, there are also 
weaknesses due to lack of protection against some 
attacking conditions such as a packet flooding attack 
uses a valid IP address. For this experiment, an ICMPv6 
flood attack with the real address was used as a sample of 
attack because it is the most basic and popular among 
those other attacks (Udhayan and Anitha, 2009). In 
addition, this attack is easily constituted and highly 
destructive among various DoSIDDoS attacks (Kumar, 
2007; Udhayan and Anitha, 2009). This attack, also known 
as ping flood attack and can be applied by using the 
"Ping" command for the most Operating System (OS). 
Hardware and software requirement: All processes were 
supported by a multi platform OS with several selected 
software and hardware. This selection was recorded from 
the analysis and observation. Table 2 describes the 
hardware and software used in the experiment. 
Environment setup: This section describes the methods 
of installation and configuration of the environment. An 
experiment was conducted accordance with a basic IPv6 
network using the IPv6 tunneling mechanism as a path to 
other IPv6 networks and for reducing instability that may 
affect the results, all experiments were conducted under a 
controlled environment. 
Basically, the testbed, as shown in Fig. 5, is 
developed with several different dual stack networks, 
namely the DS_Network_A, the DS_Network_B and the 
DS_Network_C. Here, Router_A and Router_C act as: 
Table 2: Hardware and software 
Hardware/Software Type 
Network Security tools Snort 2.8.3 (snort rules 2.4), Kiwi Syslog Server 
9.0.3, WinPcap 4.1.1, Oinkmaster 2.0, 
Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer 2.1.1, 
WireShark 1.2.6., COMODO Firewall 3.1 
C code Initiator of attack. 
Router Cisco 2811 with IOS 12.2(2) T 
Host Ms Windows 7 and Linux Fedora 9 
Switch Cisco Catalyst 2960-24TT 24-Port Ethernet 
Switch 
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Fig. 4: The experiment work flow that contains of several parts 
Attackers 
Fig. 5: Tesbed developed according to the desired 
environment 
communication devices for the tunnel between the 
DS_Network_A and the rest of the networks. Next, the 
Firewall and the IDS are placed at the tunnel between 
Router _B and Router_ C. After that, traffic on this tunnel 
is monitored by the Network_Analyzer. Nodes on the 
DS Network A are used as attackers and each of them 
run multiple commands in parallel at the same time. One 
node in each of the DS Network Band DS Network C 
were identified as the victim nodes. 
TESTING AND EVALUATION 
Experiments were conducted to obtain the results, 
through two different experiments called the Validation 
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Test and Threat on Tunneling. The first experiment was 
aimed to ensure that the firewall and IDS were 
functioning. The second test was performed to meet the 
study's objective. 
The validation test experiment: The first step was to 
produce an early threat situation ofIC:tv!P flood attacks on 
the IPv4 environment. This was implemented using the 
IC:tv!P packet encapsulation or IPv4 Protocol-I on layer 3 
OSI model. IC:tv!P echo request packets were launched 
from the DS Network A in which 10 nodes has been set 
as attackers and the target or the victim's node is set in 
the DS_Network_B and DS_Network_C. The packets 
were produced by the ICMP echo command using C 
programming. This flood attack was used to flood large 
amounts of data packets to the victim's node in an 
attempt to overload it. The following is part of the 
programming script used on the attacker node to initiate 
the attack. 
#defme BUFFER_SIZE 1000 
#def me PA CKEr _DELAY_ USEC 30 
#defmeDEF_NUM_PACKETS 100 
void set_ip_layer_fields(struct icmphdr *icmp, struct ip *ip) 
{ 
II IP Layer 
ip->ip_v = 4; 
ip->ip_hl = sizeof*ip » 2; 
ip->ip_tos = O; 
ip->ip _len = htons(sizeof(buf)); 
ip->ip_id = htons(4321); 
ip->ip_off= htons(O); 
ip->ip_ttl = 255; 
ip->ip_p = 1; 
ip->ip _sum= O; I* Let kernel fill in *I 
II !Cl\1P Layer icmp->type = IClVIP _ECHO; 
icmp->code = O; 
icmp->checksum = htons(-(1Cl\1P _ECHO« 8)); 
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Command line arguments: 
# ./icmp _flood <saddr> <daddr> <#packets> 
<saddr> = spoofed source address 
<daddr> =target IP address 
<# packets> = is the number of packets to send. 
The first argument needed in the script is the source 
IP address, the second argument is the destination 
address, and the third is the number of packets to be 
sent. The program above instructs the attacker node to 
generate packets to the victim node with IPv4 protocol-I 
and IClvlP type-0 (IC:MP echo request). The buffer size of 
all packets is constant and equal to 1000 bytes. At the 
same time, all network security tools which task was to 
evaluate had been activated. Network Analyzer (NA) was 
used to validate all the IC:MP packets. This scenario is 
illustrated by Fig. 6. 
Threat on tunneling experiment: In this experiment, the 
same approach as the previous experiment is used but 
with both IPv4 and IPv6 are enabled. An IPv4 Protocol-41 
or IPv6-in-IPv4 encapsulation process was used. IC1v1Pv6 
echo request (IPv6 next header-58 and IC.tvrPv6 type-128) 
packets were launched from 1 0 nodes in the 
Firewall 
I IDS 
Attack nodes i ! !'A 
Victim 
node 
Fig. 6: The validation test environment 
Attack nodes 
Tunnel end pionts Tunnel and pionts 
protocol -41 
encapsulated 
Victim node 
~ r·-·-! 
0---..~ i 
Firewall 
I I . I 
I 
. I 
I NA 
IDS 
I 
protocol -41 
-de 
encapsulated 
Fig. 7: The Threat on tunneling test environment 
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DS Network A as the attackers and the victims is in the 
- -
DS Network Band in DS Network C. 
The Firewall, IDS and NA were reused for the same 
purpose as the previous experiment. This scenario is 
shown through Fig. 7. 
RESULTS 
In the testing phase, the IDS have shown its ability 
to detect threats created by the IC.tvrP flood attacks 
towards the Victim_B. The same result was produced 
when the second attack conducted to the Victim C. 
Meanwhile, the firewall has been allowing IC.tvrP echo 
request packet entering the networks. Although, it 
obviously looked that the load of echo request packets 
were modified, yet the firewall default rules had ignored 
the packets. Fig. 8 show some alerts displayed by the 
Kiwi_ syslog immediately after the attack was launched. 
The observation through the NA shows that the 
captured packet is correctly significance with the reading. 
Fig. 9 shows traffic captured by NA is and the result 
proved that IDS had been activated and was functional. 
On the second experiment, it was found that the IDS 
have no reaction after the threats are launched to both 
127_0_,:'.1 Mar C•S 17:22:.52· 
Na.zrulJi.B snort: [l :4C•S: 5] r::n; Ec!".o 
Reply [:::la.ssi..fic:atic1r:: ~iisc: acti~.rity] 
[~riority: SJ: {I:!~!?) 1?!~.168_::.::~s -> 
1Sl.H2. 2 .1 
03-<J?-1Cll l'7:Le:;:,5 A.utt .. _F..le:rt 
1~'7~0~C·.l Mar 03 1':':~2:.55 NazrulFB 
2nort: [1:3.22:/] I~lP PIN:; Windm•2 
[Cla.ssifica.tior:: Misc acti7it71·} 
[;'riority: SJ: {IC!-lP] 1:?1.1f2-2_1 -> 
Fig. 8: Some of the IDS alert appeared on syslog 
·~3-C,'9-2.C'll 1'7: =::e ::5.5 1o_utt..;._1e::::t 
12 7 .. D. ·). l !-!ar C? l 1:: 22 ·: .s,:, 
!Jazrul?-...S snnrt,.: [1: 4C12: EJ r:H;i Ec:b.o 
Re.pl~, .. [C:la.ssi.:fica.ti:rr~: Hise ac'C::.""]ity1 
[:Priority:· 2<]: { IC}Gl} 1 ·30 .1:62. 8 .2,:,3 -> 
i·:;l.1£2_2.l 
sr:ort: [ 1: 322 :c] IOI? PING .,,,indo>.•s 
[:::lassiiication: ~fisc: acti'";ityJ 
[;ricirit.y: 3]: {IC}frl} 1"91.1€2.2.1 -> 
l '3G . .162 .. 8 .2.53 
Fig. 9: The packet captured by network analyzer 
Inform. Technol. J., 11(2):191-199, 2012 
Table 3: Sumrrnny ofresults obtained from the e~eriments. 
Pa~ket flooding Fnca[!sulate Victim nodes 
Validation test experiment 
!CMP IPv4 Protocol-! Victim_B 
JC!v!P IPv4 Protocol-! Victim_C 
Threat on tunneling experiment 
JC!v!Pv6 IPv4 Protocol-41 Victim_B 
JC!v!Pv6 IPv4 Protocol-41 Victim_C 
JC!v!Pv6 IPv4 Protocol-41 Victim_B 
JC!v!Pv6 IPv4 Protocol-41 Victim C 
2? 9_?91703 2001:4~0:1S:174: :1 
.zoc~o:4ED:2.0:1:34.:.::<-5:.=._:;;::~4 IC?·l.?7£ Eci"~O 
reque:: t 
:Protocols in =r=.rr=:: e:th:i.p.:ip~.:-£.:i•:::rr.p76:data 
28 5.7?~55E 2000:420:~0:1E4:5:5:E:~S4 
;,';;OC>l:4'7C>:l2 :174: :1 I-:!-1:;--:.,-£ Echo repl::t 
0~:a?:1s.~57350000 
?r::itccol:s in :fran:e::: e:tl""_:ip:ipv-E:ic:rr.p-:.-f:da.ta. 
Fig. 10: IC:MPv6 in IPv4 Protocol-41 packet through 
tunneling captured by Network Analyzer. 
victim_ B and Victim_ C, even the NA did not indicate 
there are threat in the traffics. From the observation, this 
is due to the default firewall configuration that had 
dropped all the Protocol-41 traffic. The IDS still did not 
detect any malicious activity in the traffic although the 
firewall rule set has been changed to a new configuration 
and the test is repeated. Thus it shows that the IDS see 
IPv4 protocol-41 as a non -malicious packet even though 
it's containing a malicious content. Fig. 10 shows the 
content of example of IC:MP echo request and reply 
captured by NA The readings showed that the threat 
attack by IC:tv:IPv6 packet is exist but the IDS see it as a 
normal traffic. Table 3 summarized the result of the entire 
experiment. 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, the aim is to confirm the effectiveness 
of conventional network security tools to detect any 
anomalies occurring on a tunneling mechanism especially 
against packet flooding attack in IPv6 turtneling. The 
result of the experiments shows the selected Firewall with 
default rule set is incapable to filter the IC11Pv6 flood 
traffic that travel through the turtneling mechanism. It 
proves the finding of Colitti et al. (2004) and Taib and 
Budiarto (2007) that the limitation problem on the firewall 
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Firewall IDS Networl< analyzer 
Allowed detected indicated 
Allowed detected indicated 
Denied (Default Setting) undetected Not indicated 
Denied (Default Setting) undetected Not indicated 
Allowed undetected Indicated 
Allowed undetected Indicated 
in recognizing the packet IPv4 protocol-41 since the 
firewall are only inspecting the exterior of the packet and 
do not investigate the payload content. In this case, 
blocking this protocol on the firewall setting is not the 
best solution as it will terminate the tunnel link, meanwhile 
ifthe firewall setting is too loose it will expose the network 
infrastructure to attack that can hide under the 
encapsulated packet. Hence, to improve the defense 
mechanism for the transition process to IPv6, 
administrator can consider deploying another firewall 
solely for IPv6 traffic at the both end of tunneling 
mechanism but this will only increase the cost. 
The similar occurrence is found on IDS. The results 
obtained sustain the opinion by Bai and Kobayashi (2003) 
and Tseng et al. (2004) that IDS is unable to filter the IPv4 
Protocol-41 payload and the lack of set of rules pertaining 
to new intrusion activity makes it less effective to detect 
threat luring in the tunneling environment. Likewise, the 
threat packet might be overlooked due to the IDS 
overwhelmed with processing the set of rules in 
comparing the captured packet with the signature. For 
that reason, some serious actions are needed in order to 
achieve the highest possible level of security. As a matter 
of concern, it is highly recommended to improve the 
detection technique of this network security tools, 
especially in IPv6 transition mechanisms. According to 
Lorenzo-Fonseca et al. (2009). various research studies 
recommended anomaly detection based on Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) is an appropriate technique for 
this effort. 
Although Firewall and IDS are widely used as a 
conventional defense mechanism, there are still some 
other potential alternative safety tools can be considered. 
One of the options to be added to the defense mechanism 
is by using NA as packet viewer software. As 
implemented NA in this study and also supported by 
Zagar and Grgic (2006), anomaly packets were clearly 
appeared on the output status display. The only 
drawback of placing NA as a safeguard tool is that NA 
cannot detect and alert the administrator automatically, it 
will require the administrator to recognize the attack by 
the way of observing the anomalies in captured network 
traffic patterns. 
Inform. Technol. J., 11(2):191-199, 2012 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion this research found that the current 
filtering and detection technique of the firewall and IDS 
are not fully capable of solving the network security 
problem during the transition period of IPv4 to IPv6 
network. Further research need to be done to overcome 
this security problem. In the near future, this research will 
be focusing on developing a suitable technique to detect 
the threats of DoS/DDoS attacks through the IPv6 
tunneling mechanism, especially on automatic tunneling. 
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